Introduction
François Marie Arouet was born in 1694 when the Ancien Régime -the iron fist of Louis XIV in the velvet glove of Versailles -seemed insouciant, eternal, and impervious to change. Yet by the time of Arouet's death in 1778, the Enlightenment had wrought such a destabilising effect upon the old order that it was on the point of collapse. Arouet, writing under the nom de plume Voltaire, 1 was a pivotal figure in the development of modern Western ideas about government and justice. Playwright, essayist, and critic, he was above all a relentless fighter against cruelty and superstition. I doubt many would disagree with me when I say that we still have need of such fighters. But sometimes we find the advocates of cruelty and superstition in surprising places.
Voltaire's battle cry against the enemies of Enlightenment was 'Écrasez l'infâme'. 2 You must wipe out infamy. But what was so infamous as to mandate utter obliteration? On one level, the Catholic Church of his day; on another, the whole system of absolutism that held France, and most of Europe, in thrall. What they had in common was this: a power that was entirely unaccountable, entirely unlimited, and which instilled a climate of fear through the measured dosage of cruelty.
Yet ironically, as the case of Voltaire demonstrates, the very brutality of torture undermined the stability of the state. Many people were naturally horrified by events like the death of Damiens. Many more recalled, or had occasion to experience the lettres des cachets, which entitled the French state to lock their opponents up without trial, without explanation, and at His Majesty's pleasure. Thus torture and arbitrary punishment became imbued with a wholly different set of meanings than that intended by the state. It came to show not the power of the state, but its insecurity; to suggest not the divinity of the sovereign but his partiality; to instil not a kind of passivity and submission in the population but on the contrary to generate activity and resistance. These provocations exploded into life at the end of the eighteenth century, wiping out not just these notorious practices but the regime with which they had become synonymous.
Torture in Theory
Foucault argues that since the Enlightenment, power has been exercised in quite different ways: not by the punishment of bodies, but through the disciplining of minds; not through dramatic acts that destroy us utterly, but through tiny daily pressures that encourage us to conform; not in a public square and periodically, but every day in homes, schools, factories, armies, hospitals. The end of torture as a state institution was coupled by the rise of other institutions, less violent and more subtly committed to moulding 'docile bodies'. 7 But perhaps we have written off the Ancien Régime too quickly. In 2005, two Australian academics, Professor Mirko Bagaric and Julie Clarke, attracted widespread attention by arguing that torture is a 'permissible' and even a 'moral' action in certain circumstances. 8 Within days, Peter Faris, one-time head of the now defunct National Crime Authority, was reported as supporting the 'call'. 9 And of course in the United States, arguments for the necessity of occasional and exceptional acts of torture or unlimited detention circulate regularly in the halls of government as well as in the pages of the law reviews. In good lawyerly fashion, Bagaric and Clarke discuss the question in abstractions entirely shorn of any social context. The necessity of torture is presented in purely theoretical terms. Torture, they say, is only justifiable where 'it is used as an information-gathering technique to avert a grave risk'. 11 Elsewhere, while not ruling out the torture of an 'innocent person' to obtain vital information, they focus on the archetypal hypothesis in which 'torturing a wrongdoer … is the only means, due to the immediacy of the situation, to save the life of an innocent person'. 12 Now they caveat this argument by conceding that 'none of the recent high profile cases of torture appear to satisfy these criteria'. 13 Well isn't that nice to know. So the question is presented as a thought experiment designed to help us interrogate, so to speak, our moral instincts; to approach them in a reasoned rather than a merely emotional way. The thought experiment is meant to encourage us to think more clearly about a subject that is often, they tell us, a prey to fuzzy passions, 14 and unfairly tainted by irrational and inappropriate 'pejorative connotations'. 15 Their stated goal is to normalise torture, to encourage us to see it as no different from any other tool of social policy.
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But it is not remotely plausible to attempt to disassociate the article's reflections on the legality of torture from a social context in which the use of torture by governments is in fact on the rise, and is openly being presented as legitimate and even necessary in the 'post-9/11 world': by government spokesmen and soldiers, television producers and talk-show hosts. The top-rated television show '24' has depicted no less than 67 instances of torture on the part of its heroes in its five years, and the untrammelled sovereignty exhibited by its counter-terrorist star, Jack Bauer, is beginning to exercise a considerable sway over the minds and imagination of many trainee soldiers and interrogators. 17 The legitimacy of torture is undoubtedly back on the agenda.
Neither of course is there anything in the least fictional or coincidental about the discussion of torture at this moment in time. We are familiar with the dismal story of Abu Ghraib. But this was no isolated instance. In pursuit of the so-called 'global war against terrorism', the United States has not only been involved in cases of torture itself, but has routinely sent -the term used is 'rendered' - 11 Bagaric and Clarke, USFLR above n 8, 611. 12 Bagaric and Clarke, SMH above n 8; USFLR above n 8, 612-14. 13 Ibid 616. 14 See in particular Bagaric and Clarke, SMH above n 8. 15 Neither do the authors themselves sincerely believe that the argument they make is so limited and hypothetical. They attack the 'misguided', 'alarmist', 'reflexive', 'absolutist' and 'short-sighted' 'moral indecency' of our belief that torture is always wrong. 29 They describe torture as suffering from 'pejorative connotations'
[sic] and its critics as 'illogical' while their own defence of torture is 'dispassionate' and 'analytical'. 30 Poor Voltaire. He has been accused of many things, but rarely all at once. Whatever else we may say of Bagaric and Clarke, their argument is rich in emotion and rhetoric. True enough, they say that their defence of torture is so cautiously phrased that 'a real-life situation where torture is justifiable [might] not eventuate'. But in the very next paragraph they conclude: 'the argument in favour of torture in limited circumstances needs to be made because it will encourage the community to think more carefully about moral judgments we collectively hold that are the cause of an enormous amount of suffering in the world'. 31 I wonder what hasty moral judgments they have in mind as being responsible for 'an enormous amount of suffering'? The sole example they provide is our fanatical, woolly-headed prohibition of torture. So this is what their argument must mean: the prohibition against torture is doing our society enormous harm and causing enormous suffering not only in some hypothetical thought-world, but right now.
Even if we take Bagaric and Clarke's very modest proposal for torture at face value, it is logically inseparable from the real-world practices they disavow. Torture by its very nature deals with uncertainty; ignorance is the problem that it claims to solve through the exercise of violence. Yet torture produces such exceptionally unreliable information that it is thought to be largely useless.
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All Western legal systems acknowledge this by excluding as unreliable the fruit of torture. 33 But the authors blandly assert, in one short paragraph and on the basis of a single strangely unconvincing anecdote, that 'the main benefit of torture is that it is an excellent means of gathering information. Humans have an intense desire to avoid pain … and most will comply with the demands of a torturer to avoid the pain.' 34 They appear oblivious to how far short of convincing this 'argument' is; nor do they appear to grasp the difference between 'compliance' and 'truth'. Let alone 'evidence'. The central reason that Australian suspect Mamdouh Habib was finally released from US custody is that he had been tortured, and therefore any confession he made was legally inadmissible in any court. 35 Having been tortured, Habib could never be put on trial. Bagaric 29 Bagaric and Clarke, SMH, above n 8. 30 Bagaric and Clarke, USFLR, above n 8, 583-4. 31 Bagaric and Clarke, SMH, above n 8. 32 For an historical understanding, see P duBois, Torture and Truth (New York: Routledge, 1991 and Clarke do not explain why they believe that torture produces good evidence. On the contrary, under current law, it produces no evidence at all. Bagaric, at least, apparently thinks that in such circumstances the rules of evidence are hopelessly outdated and irritatingly inconvenient; 36 but that is at the very least an argument that would have to be made with some care, and Bagaric and Clarke do not bother to do so. Now let us look at the problem of ignorance and uncertainty from the torturer's point of view. A licensed torturer cannot know that a supposed terrorist (for example) is the only way to locate a bomb; or that there is a bomb; or that he will tell the truth under torture; or even that he is a terrorist. The torturer suspects these things or rather he says he knows these things, and of course he has every reason to say he knows these things, because that is the approach that justifies his actions. It is human nature to see the confused and ambiguous world in the way that is most convenient to us. Suppose our supposed terrorist denies knowing anything. Do we let him go or torture him some more? When exactly do we stop? When exactly do we believe what the victim is telling us when the justification of torture is precisely that we only believe him when he tells us what we want to know, without our already knowing it?
There is a paradox here that leads inexorably to the kind of grey areas or 'slippery slope' in the use of torture by interrogators for which Bagaric and Clarke attempt to deny all responsibility. Given the existence of criteria under which torture becomes acceptable, even the narrow criteria that Bagaric and Clarke provide, the pressure on someone in a volatile and violent situation to see his enemy in a way that will justify torture is irresistible. So the question is: how much useless torture is justifiable in these troubled times? The authors concede that their modest proposal may not lead to torture that saves a life. But they do not tell you the logical corollary: it must and will lead to torture, and therefore by their own reasoning it must and will lead to torture that does not save a life. I have seen no-one in the whole current debate over the role of torture in counter-terrorism even address this issue. Instead we have fallen victim to the Jack Bauer fallacy. Of the 67 instances of torture on '24', Jack extracts 67 crucial pieces of life-saving information. But that is not our world and never, ever, will be.
Torture in Practice
In our world, it is duplicitous to describe torture, as Bagaric and Clarke do, at least in their newspaper articles, as 'inflicting a relatively small level of harm on a wrongdoer'. 37 The article, which appeared in 39 There is surely no reason to think that highly motivated terrorists would find the suffering of a specific 'level of harm' impossible to bear. The power of torture, in most instances, comes instead from the promise that the torturer makes that the pain will not stop unless you talk and will get worse until you do. It is a logical contradiction to imagine that torture can be regulated, as Bagaric and Clarke seem to imagine, because it is part of its essence as torture that the victim is beyond protection and that resistance is futile. In addition, it is an essential and well-documented part of its psychology that the torturer is the sole arbitrator of life and death. 40 The whole dynamic of torture involves the reduction of one party to pure power and the other to pure powerlessness. In short, and I believe this is a central point that the authors have not understood, torture gets people to talk (not, of course, to tell the truth, but certainly to talk: you will recall that the authors confuse 'comply with the demands of a torture' and 'an excellent means of gathering information' 41 ) if and only if the torturer is sovereign. I suspect that a torturer-cum-bureaucrat is a contradiction in terms.
It is frankly appalling that so many writers are prepared to trivialise the very practice they advocate. Perhaps Bagaric and Clarke have read nothing about the nature of pain, memory, and fear. 42 Perhaps they have not read a single thing about the experience of torture and its implications on those who suffer it and those around them. 43 Torture is not simply pain. It is an experience of absolute powerlessness that reduces the victim, in their own eyes as well as their torturer's, to an animal, a bare life without will or dignity of any kind. 44 It is the destruction of identity. Torture is rape just as rape is torture. It is not something to shrug off or even, most of the time, to get over. Neither should we limit our analysis to the impact of torture on a single individual during a single finite emergency, a limiting of the actual costs and effects of torture that Bagaric and Clarke engage in quite explicitly. 45 In the world we live in and in which Bagaric and Clarke's argument actually matters, torture is never about the emergency rescue of an innocent life. It is used to extract a wide range of information about the functioning of many outlaw groups. But because of the inherent unreliability of its evidence, this is not its main purpose. Torture is used to punish and humiliate dissidents, terrorists, and members of ethnic minorities. And it is used as a calibrated dose of cruelty through which to terrorise the whole community to which they belong. 46 Just as in the case of Damiens, torture is a demonstration of what the state can do to you and what it can get you to do. The effect is to create a generalised fear about the infinite and random power of the state to destroy lives, and an intense sense of vulnerability in victim populations.
We need to think about the effects of torture not merely on the bodies that suffer pain but on the families and communities around them who live under its constant and unavoidable shadow. Torture affects whole societies: it terrorises them and ultimately, as we saw in Voltaire's Europe, the powerlessness it instils shifts from passivity to rage. The turning point in the lives of many Al Qai'da operatives was their imprisonment and torture in Egyptian, Syrian, and other Middle Eastern prisons: this same Egypt to which the United States still 'renders' suspects in order to soften them up. 47 Torture is in real danger of producing terrorists: whole families and villages of them. That is why the prisoners in Guantánamo Bay -according to the Secretary-General of Amnesty International, part of the 'gulag of our times' 48 -are proving to be an increasingly insoluble problem for the US, and many fear now that they may never be able to be released. How can they be? Bystanders or warriors initially, they are much greater risks to us now.
To these real and far-reaching consequences, which our society would have to understand, accept, and somehow combat if we were ever to accept Bagaric and Clarke's argument, the authors have paid no attention at all.
Defending It
I have argued, first logically and then practically, that it is impossible to accept this modest proposal for torture in its own neatly limited terms. We still have to imagine to what consequences such a principle would actually lead. But for 45 Bagaric and Clarke, USFLR, above n 8, 613-4. 46 the sake of argument let us look a little closer at the ways in which Bagaric and Clarke, amongst others, attempt to defend an entitlement to torture. 49 Thus it is said that the prohibition against torture has only served, by its unnecessary absolutism, to drive it 'beneath the radar screen of accountability'; legalisation 'would reduce the instances of torture'. 50 It is difficult to see why this assertion would be true. Our societies are not without experience of legal torture. Was there less of it then? Moreover, the emotions that lead to real torture -fear, crisis, hatred -will not be reduced by legality. In what sense will 'accountability' make a difference to the practice of torture except to provide a helpful framework in which it can be organised, carried out and defended?
I admit that the radar argument sounds plausible: illegality does not always work and sometimes seems to make matters worse. 51 This is particularly the case, for example, in relation to so-called victimless crimes such as drug use. Indeed, Bagaric and Clarke are explicit in adopting for themselves a discourse of 'harm minimisation' drawn from that literature. 52 But torture is hardly victimless. Let us look a little closer to see where the analogy falls down. With drug use or prostitution, the argument is that legalisation will clean up the secretive conditions in which they occur and therefore not lessen the incidence of them but instead make them safer. In general, the scholars of what is called 'harm minimisation' do not contend that a more open approach to drugs will lead to less use; only that it will dramatically improve the social and health conditions of users. 53 But it is not the conditions under which torture is practised that are the problem. Danger and pain are not a by-product of torture (as they are, for example, to a considerable degree a by-product of the current regime of drug prohibition); they are the purpose of it. Were torture done in public, were it supervised by a qualified medical practitioner in an hygienic environment, were it made respectable -tell me, would any of this make torture better? Once again Voltaire comes to mind: 'If we believe absurdities, we shall commit atrocities.'
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The centre-piece of Bagaric and Clarke's defence offers as obvious example of begging the question as I have seen. They argue by analogy to 'the right to 49 I leave aside their criticism of the 'slippery slope' argument to which I have referred above. 50 self-defence, which extends to the right to defend another'. 55 Just as we are entitled to respond with violence to a murderous attack, they say, we are entitled to protect others; if the only way to protect them is by torturing somebody for information, then torture must be legitimate too. But the analogy falls down in at least three ways. First, the principle of self-defence recognises a reality: when it is 'him or me' a law that said I could not respond to an attacker would be simply unenforceable. 56 Here the violence of torture is a choice deliberately made and carried out, and not purely responsive.
Second, their analogy assumes the only point it needs to prove. One can legally defend oneself; one can even kill an attacker if necessary; but what legal system has ever authorised a case of torture 'in self-defence'? Why do the authors assume that self-defence, which is strictly limited to a direct, minimal and reasonable response to threat, 57 is in any way equivalent to torture, which is by its very nature indirect and maximal? In fact, our societies have, at least since the Enlightenment, feared pain more than death, 58 believed that human dignity requires absolute protection under all circumstances, and for that very reason thought torture a more serious act than execution. Legal systems throughout the world outlawed torture long, long before capital punishment. In the US, torture has always been contrary to the 8th Amendment; it is the paradigmatic example of 'cruel and unusual punishment'. 59 Yet the death penalty continues to be applied -as painlessly as possible. 60 So clearly in the US, throughout the world, and by most people, it is generally considered worse to torture than to kill. 61 As Bagaric and Clarke go to some lengths to point out, we do indeed often ask many people, including civilians, to make the ultimate sacrifice for the good of others, for example in times of war. 62 Bagaric and Clarke think it obvious that if we can kill someone in self-defence, or require them to die for us, therefore it must be all right to torture them. But this is precisely what the absolute prohibition of torture rejects. Bagaric and Clarke could certainly make an argument against this orthodoxy. But neither they nor, to the best of my knowledge, other apologists for torture have attempted to do so. They simply assert their position as self-evident. It is nothing of the kind.
There is a third, and to my mind even more important way in which the analogy between self-defence and torture fails. Self-defence is about individual action, torture is about government action: the limits are not necessarily the same. There is a profound difference between individual acts of violence and a system of government-regulated torture. There is a difference between kidnapping and government sponsored 'disappearance'. There is a difference between murder -even mass murder -and genocide. 63 The difference is the government sanction and the government power that stands behind it in each case.
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Government action -law -carries a mark of legitimacy with it. Self-defence, which leads to murder, or even revenge, might elicit our sympathy. We might even in some way excuse it. But it is not the same thing as a government program, which establishes, institutionalises, administers, and authorises torture. No matter how limited, torture is thereby made right in a way that no act of personal self-defence ever makes murder right. We hold governments to higher standards for a good reason.
So too, the reach and mechanisms of government power make torture a weapon from which no member of the community will feel immune. If the state could torture any one of us -they probably would not but they could -what sort of a society would we live in? Now Bagaric and Clarke attempt to avoid this problem by implying that torture would only affect the very few that in some sense deserved it. Although they admit that there may be situations in which 'torturing the innocent' to extract information would be justifiable if enough lives were thereby saved, the purchase of their argument as to the moral justifiability of torture rests on distinguishing those who are in danger and 'blameless', from those who are 'wrongdoers.' 65 In the newspaper articles written at the same time, the authors make this distinction central to their construction of the moral basis for torture. There, they insist that it is 'verging on moral indecency … to favour the interests of wrongdoers over those of the innocent'.
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One way or another, the notion of wrongdoing underlies their assumption that we have the right person; that their suffering can be used to save another's life; and that even if the torture fails to elicit information the loss is not in the end so very terrible.
But who are these 'wrongdoers' who, according to the general assumptions that underscore this whole debate, can be legitimately made to suffer so that the innocent might live? Perhaps they are only the associates of terrorists, or family members; and in any case any torture that takes place will very probably precede 63 In the real world, which again I realise it might be considered bad form to bring up, there are many reasons why we might all live in fear of a government that had reserved to itself some kind of right to torture suspects who it has determined in some way are 'wrongdoers'. Perhaps it might just be a case of mistaken identity, or maybe you happened to be born with a foreign sounding name, or maybe you look suspicious or are the wrong colour, or come from a country with a violent history, or are otherwise associated with the wrong people, or perhaps you were just known for holding unpopular opinions at one time or other. How much torture might it take to show that you were not really a 'wrongdoer' after all? And what effect would that endemic, nagging fear have on all our lives and our relationship to the state? Peter Faris, former head of the National Crime Authority, says it would be alright 'to pull out a fingernail of a terrorist in order to save a couple of million lives'. 69 But the government legitimisation of torture, whatever the reason, would ultimately serve only to cripple a few million lives and corrupt our understanding of law and of justice. Bagaric and Clarke try and avoid these profoundly serious consequences by insisting that 'our decisions in extreme situations will be compartmentalised to desperate predicaments'. 70 But it is precisely this effort to quarantine our thinking about torture that is inevitably doomed to failure.
Opposing it
The apologists cannot see the difference between self-defence and torture because they are concerned only about outcomes and never about means. For Bagaric and Clarke, it is simply a mathematical calculation: a tortured terrorist versus one innocent life or many. They even offer us a comforting formula at the end: 67 Gonzales, above n 21. 68 Bagaric and Clarke, USFR, above n 8, 612. 69 Bagaric and Clarke, SMH, above n 8. 70 Bagaric and Clarke, USFR, above n 8, 607.
W+L+P/T x O = torture. 71 This effort at calculation no doubt underpins any argument for the expediency of torture in a 'state of exception'. 72 It is, of course and as they argue, a version of utilitarianism. 73 The authors are at pains to defend the validity of utilitarianism as a moral theory. But they do so dishonestly because they have made no serious effort to take into account the actual costs of the balancing act they propose. In most versions of the utilitarian calculus, which one hears in defence of such extreme measures, and Bagaric and Clarke's version is no exception, the real benefits are a sheer fantasy and the real costs are wholly and shamefully ignored.
Against utilitarianism, there is not much to say that has not been said many times before. Ethics means that there are some things you do not do even though it might advantage you (or the whole society) to do them. Ethics means that we impose limits on our actions that cannot be reduced to a calculation about winners and losers. Slavery, for example, would not be less wrong if more people gained from it than lost. It would not be less wrong even if we only enslaved 'wrongdoers'. The wrong is intrinsic and irredeemable. It is not negotiable in terms of costs and benefits. 74 Bagaric and Clarke argue that the problem with absolutist theories is that there is no fundamental virtue that grounds them. 75 This misses the point. The particular instances are the virtues. The prohibition of slavery is one, irreducible to some other more abstract principle. The prohibition against torture is another.
So too, human rights protect not just good people but all people, and not just some of the time but all of the time: they are not to be weighed up, or sacrificed. It is in the nature of a human right that it is incalculable. We might feel that certain people have acted in such a way that they no longer deserve to be treated humanely, and if society as a whole were to gain by torturing them a little, then we should be allowed to do so. But human rights are not something we deserve. They protect each of us from abuse by protecting all of us unconditionally. These rights recognise as inviolable the core of our autonomy as human beings, regardless of the temptation or the need to violate them. The argument is undoubtedly partial and problematic 76 and Bagaric and Clarke are right to draw any theoretical claim at all) often are. 77 Nevertheless, if there is anything at all that we have a right to protect against the government and against all of society, it is not just our bodily integrity but our sanity, our very self. That is the absolute right of which torture threatens to deprive us. Simply in terms of 'weighing up' the costs and benefits, in order to evaluate seriously the prohibition against torture in utilitarian terms, rather more than a fingernail is at stake.
Torture is wrong under all circumstances, not because it leads to certain bad outcomes, but for no reason: simply and inherently. This is not a perverse argument. Love, for example, is good not because it might lead us to wealth or happiness, but for no reason. 78 I have been assured by a very knowing American of my acquaintance in London, that a young healthy child well nursed is at a year old a most delicious, nourishing, and wholesome food, whether stewed, roasted, baked, or boiled; and I make no doubt that it will equally serve in a fricassee or a ragout. 79 There's a solution to famine for you, and what after all is wrong with it? If children seem too innocent, we could just eat those in the reformatories, wrongdoers each and every one. Without a sense of our limits, the calibration of costs and benefits is unstoppable: and we shall be led to commit atrocities. It strikes me that the current modest proposal for torture makes the same mistakes: slipping seamlessly and without argument across fundamental distinctions, ignoring the social context it echoes, blind to the horrific practical implications of the system it envisages, far too confident of the reliability and accuracy of its own judgments. But Swift's modest proposal was satire, while Bagaric and Clarke's is not.
The second approach is historical. Both proposals, above all, display that dangerous human quality of arrogance, which assumes that we can and should weigh up one person's pain and a community's fear, against another's life. It is the economists' approach to life and the tyrant's approach to politics: everything is a calculation, and no calculation is too ambitious to be foresworn. The use of such formulae will offer an easy answer to all our problems, but the easy answers are usually wrong. We know all about the Western history of state-sanctioned torture, l'amende honorable and the Inquisition. It is not a tradition worth reviving.
Our repugnance is not simply the instinctive and 'reflex rejection of torture' that Bagaric and Clarke disparage. 80 Disgust, like shame, is not a pointless emotion. On the contrary, it is an exceptionally powerful way to change the behaviour of people and of communities. 81 A great deal of effort and thought has been expended giving torture the 'pejorative connotations' it has today. We have learnt this feeling of disgust over several centuries. Voltaire would weep to read the arguments now being used to justify a new-found tolerance of torture and tyranny. He saw torture and he knew what it smelled like. And he also knew that at some point the arguments must stop so that the disgust might begin. Écrasez l'infâme. Don't negotiate: wipe it out. 80 Bagaric and Clarke claim that when faced with the kind of hypothetical on which their argument is built, 'not many' people would find torture unacceptable. But the statistic they cite does not even remotely justify this particular lithe assertion: see USFLR, above n 8, 583 fn 8. If Bagaric and Clarke's idea of 'not many' people is 53 per cent then I fear for the way in which they would put in practice the neat mathematical calculation called 'The Formula' they think will clarify for us when torture is justified. The point is not trivial. When investigators justify torture, as when intellectuals interpret statistics, they are prone to see what they want to see, to justify the result they want to achieve. 81 
